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I.

INTRODUCTION

On June 24, 1999, a unanimous Texas Supreme Com:t held that a
mental health patient's threat to kill an identifiable person did not
impose a duty on a psychiatrist to warn the intended victim.1 In so
holding, the court expressly declined to follow2 the California Su
preme Court's seminal decision in Tarasoff v. Regents of the University
of California,3 which held that a psychotherapist who determines, or
reasonably should have determined, that a patient poses a serious
danger of violence to a reasonably identifiable victim has a duty to
warn that victim.4 Although several jurisdictions have adopted the

t

Dedicated to my father.
1. Thapar v. Zezulka, 994 S.W.2d 635, 636 (Tex. 1999).
2. See id. at 638.
3. 551 P.2d 334 (Cal. 1976).
4. Id. at 345. "Before Tarasoff, . ..no court had ever extended [the common law
duty to control the conduct of another] principle to a psychiatrist's relationship with a
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Tarasoffdoctrine, 5 either by statute or by case law, "[t]here can be no
doubt about the controversy and confusion created by this controversial decision. Courts continue to struggle with its legacy over twenty
years later, and despite intense, high-profile litigation, no national
consensus has been reached."6 The confusion stems from the fact that
there are significant legal consequences to a psychiatrist's decision to
disclose a patient's confidences. As one commentator succinctly put
it:
The dilemma is that if the psychiatrist reveals a confidence, the patient may register a complaint with the licensing board, and/or the
patient may have the basis for a lawsuit based on a breach of confidentiality. On the other hand, if the psychiatrist does not reveal a
confidence to protect a third person, and that person is harmed,
then that third person may have the basis for a lawsuit for the injuries suffered. 7
This Comment argues that the Texas Supreme Court was correct in
declining to follow the Tarasoff doctrine, thereby excusing Texas psychiatrists from having to face this double-edged sword. The court is to
be congratulated for finally putting an end to the ongoing debate of
whether any duty to warn third parties should be imposed on Texas
psychiatrists, regardless of whether those third parties are identifiable
or not.
Part II of this Comment outlines the facts and holding of the
Thapar case. Part III analyzes the Texas confidentiality statute that
was at issue in Thapar and will demonstrate that the Texas Supreme
Court was correct in finding that psychiatrists are under no statutory
duty to warn third parties. Part IV reviews and analyzes the common
law immediately preceding Thapar, in Texas and in other states, and
will conclude that the Thapar court was correct in refusing to recognize a common law duty to warn third parties of a patient's threats.
Part V highlights some of the justifications of the Thapar holding in
view of social and economic considerations. Finally, this Comment
concludes in Part VI that while the Thapar court is to be applauded
for its deferential approach to the legislature, the court is encouraged
to also consider the Restatement of Torts, case law preceding Thapar,
voluntary outpatient." Vanessa Merton, Confidentialityand the "Dangerous"Patient:
Implications of Tarasofffor Psychiatristsand Lawyers, 31 EMORY L.J. 263, 293 (1982).
5. Timothy E. Gammon & John K. Hulston, The Duty of Mental Health Care
Providers to Restrain Their Patients or Warn Third Parties,60 Mo. L. REV. 749, 751
(1995) (noting the states that have embraced Tarasoff).
6. Divergent Opinions Regarding the Tarasoff-Type Duty - A Double Bind, R.
FOR RISK, Winter 2000, at 1.
7. Michael J. Laub, Garamella, Conservator for the Estate of Denny Almonte v.
New York Medical College - Navigating the Murky Waters of a Psychiatrist'sDuty to

Protect Third Persons, R.

FOR RISK,

Winter 2000, at 1, 5.

8. Although referring mainly to psychiatrists, this Comment is also applicable to
all professionals in the mental health field.
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and public policy considerations in future cases, thus taking a stronger
stand against Tarasoff and forced disclosure of mental health patients'
confidential disclosures to their psychiatrists.
II.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

A.

Facts

In Thapar v. Zezulka,9 Thapar, a psychiatrist, had been treating
Freddy Lilly, the victim's stepson, for approximately three years,
mainly on an outpatient basis and always on a voluntary basis."0 During his last session with Thapar, Lilly confided that he felt like killing
his stepfather but had decided against it." Thapar did not tell Lilly's
family or law enforcement personnel of this and other similar
threats.1 2 One month later, Lilly shot his stepfather in the face at
point-blank range, killing him instantly.13 The wife of the victim
brought a wrongful death action against Thapar, alleging, among
other things, that Thapar was negligent in failing to warn the victim or
his family that Lilly had threatened to kill his stepfather during one of
Thapar's therapy sessions. 4
B.

Holding

The Texas Supreme Court held that the psychiatrist was prohibited
by the confidentiality statute from disclosing to a victim that the patient had threatened to kill the victim during a therapy session; therefore, the psychiatrist had no statutory duty to warn third parties of this
threat.' 5 The court also held that a psychiatrist to whom a patient
admitted a desire to kill an identifiable victim had no common law
16
duty to warn that victim, the victim's family, or law enforcement.
III.

THE STATUTORY DUTY TO WARN

Commentators have recognized that "[d]ue to the confusing and
conflicting case law handed down over the years, 'a consensus is developing on the preference of [using] a legislative approach' to clarify
the laws."' 7 Allowing a state's legislature to define the elements and
9. 994 S.W.2d 635, 636 (Tex. 1999).
10. See id.
11. See id.
12. See id.
13. See id.
14. Id.
15. Id. at 639.
16. Id. at 636.
17. Allison L. Almason, PersonalLiability Implications of the Duty to Warn Are
Hard Pills to Swallow: From Tarasoff to Hutchinson v. Patel and Beyond, 13 J.CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 471, 481 (1997) (alteration in original) (quoting Alan R.
Felthous, The Ever Confusing Jurisprudenceof the Psychotherapist'sDuty to Protect,
17 J. PSYCHIATRY & L. 575, 590 (1989)).
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scope of a psychiatrist's duty leads to uniformity and predictability in
case law. Moreover, the state's legislature should be the branch that
defines the duty as its findings are arguably more reflective of a state's
social policy than those of the judicial branch. The Texas Supreme
Court has respectfully recognized that "the Legislature, by reason of
its organization and investigating processes, is generally in a better
position to establish such tests than are the judicial tribunals."' 8 The
judicial branch should not pompously assume that it is in a position to
assert that public policy demands mandatory disclosure of patients'
threats over the psychiatrist-patient confidentiality privilege. 19 The
separation of powers doctrine is the cornerstone of our Constitution.
For a democratic society to prevail, the judiciary should respect the
legislative branch when deciding matters of public policy. Such deference was exhibited by the Texas Supreme Court in Thapar when it
acknowledged, "We consider legislative enactments that evidence the
adoption of a particular policy significant in determining whether to
recognize a new common law duty."20 While such deference to legislative enactment is to be encouraged, it is rendered useless if courts
turn a blind eye to the actual language of the statutes themselves. Unlike courts of other jurisdictions, Texas courts have referred to the actual words of the state's confidentiality statute to determine the extent
of the duty that a psychiatrist owes to third parties.
A.

The. Texas Statute: Reviewing the Confidentiality Statute to
Ascertain Whether the Duty to Warn Is Mandatory
or Permissive

Three years after the Tarasoff decision, the Texas Legislature enacted a statute governing the disclosure of communications between a
mental health physician and his patient, a statute that strongly protects physician-patient confidentiality. 2 The statute prohibits a
mental health professional from disclosing a client's communications
to third parties subject to certain statutory exceptions. 22 The exception at issue in Thapar is found in section 611.004 of the Texas Health
and Safety Code and provides that "[a] professional may disclose confidential information only ... to medical or law enforcement person18. Praesel v. Johnson, 967 S.W.2d 391, 396 (Tex. 1998) (quoting Parrott v. Garcia,
436 S.W.2d 897, 899-900 (Tex. 1969)).
19. Such was the case in Almonte v. New York Medical College, 851 F. Supp. 34, 41
(D. Conn. 1994), in which a Connecticut district court held that "the Connecticut
Supreme Court appears to have accepted 'the rule that a psychiatrist who knows or
should know that a patient poses a threat to a particular victim or class of victims has
a duty to warn such victims of the danger,'" despite the fact that the applicable Connecticut statute did not impose a mandatory duty on psychiatrists in such situations,
but rather merely permitted disclosure of a patient's communications or records. See
CONN. GEN. STAT.

§ 52-146F (1991) (second emphasis added).

20. Thapar, 994 S.W.2d at 639.
21. TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN.
22. Id.
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nel if the professional determines that there is a probability of
imminent physical injury by the patient to the patient or others or
probability of immediate mental or emotional injury to the
there is the
2' 3
patient.
In defining the scope of this exception, a court should review the
statute to ascertain if it mandates that psychiatrists warn third parties
or merely permits them to do so. The consequences of this interpretation are significant. Fortunately, the Texas judicial branch has recognized that the words "may" and "allow," as opposed to "must" and
"shall," are not accidental insertions and should not be blindly ignored
in statutory interpretation. z4
In Texas, the Code of Construction Act applies to any provision of
the Texas Health and Safety Code enacted by the 60th Legislature or
any subsequent legislature.2 Because section 611.004 was enacted by
the 66th Legislature, 6 the Code of Construction Act should be used
when interpreting this section.
1. A Literal Interpretation of the Confidentiality Statute Indicates
a Permissive Duty to Warn
Section 311.016 of the Code of Construction Act states that "unless
the context in which the word... appears necessarily requires a different construction or unless a different construction is expressly provided for by statute . . . '[m]ay' creates discretionary authority or
grants permission or a power."21 7 Nothing in section 611.004 or the
confidentiality statute indicates that the word "may" necessarily requires a different construction. Courts "must enforce the plain meaning of an unambiguous statute. 2z8 "The correct meaning of the word,
9
'may,' is that the [person to whom it applies] has discretion ....
"That term generally creates a discretionary, not mandatory, function."' 30 Consistent with this interpretation, no Texas court has ever
23. Id. § 611.004(a)(2) (emphasis added).
24. Thapar,994 S.W.2d at 639. See also Wright v. Ector County Indep. Sch. Dist.,
867 S.W.2d 863, 868 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1993, no writ) (stating that "[t]he ordinary
meaning of 'shall' or 'must' is of a mandatory effect, whereas the ordinary meaning of
'may' is merely permissive in nature").
25. TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 311.002 (Vernon 1998).
26. See Act of May 9, 1979, 66th Leg., R.S., ch. 239, 1979 Tex. Gen. Laws 512
(amended 1991) (current version at TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 611.004
(Vernon 2001)).
27. See TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 311.016(1). See also J.R.W. v. State, 879 S.W.2d
254, 257 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1994, no writ) (stating that "[a] statute that uses the word
,may' is permissive rather than mandatory unless there is something in the statute to
show a legislative intent that 'may' is mandatory").
28. Tune v. Tex. Dep't of Pub. Safety, 23 S.W.3d 358, 363 (Tex. 2000).
29. Bloom v. Tex. State Bd. of Exam'rs of Psychologists, 492 S.W.2d 460, 462 (Tex.
1973). Accord Womack v. Berry, 156 Tex. 44, 51, 291 S.W.2d 677, 683 (1956) (stating
that "[tlhe use of the permissive word 'may' imports the exercise of discretion").
30. In re Estate of Minnick, 653 S.W.2d 503, 508 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1983, no
writ).
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interpreted the word "may" as mandating a psychiatrist to warn third
parties. In fact, the word "may" has been held to denote a "permissive authorization" by the Texas Supreme Court.3 1 The Thapar court
held that section 611.004, through the use of the word "may," only
permits a psychiatrist to disclose confidential information and does not
require him to do so. 32 The court recognized the significance of the
Texas Legislature's decision not to impose a mandatory duty when it
reasoned that "[i]mposing a legal duty to warn third parties of patient's threats would conflict with the scheme adopted by
the Legisla33
ture by making disclosure of such threats mandatory.
The Thapar court's interpretation of the confidentiality statute is
consistent with its holding the previous year in Praesel v. Johnson,
where it interpreted a similar Texas statute as not imposing a
mandatory duty on a treating physician to warn third parties of a patient's dangerous propensity.3 4 In Praesel,an epileptic driver suffered
a seizure and collided with a car driven by Terri Lynn Praesel, who
died from the injuries she sustained.3 5 Praesel's estate brought a
wrongful death and survival action against the physicians who had
treated the epileptic driver prior to the accident, alleging, among
other things, that the physicians were negligent in failing to contact
the state Medical Advisory Board regarding the patient's condition
pursuant to a Texas Civil Statute. 36 That statute specifically provided
that
[a] physician who is licensed to practice medicine in Texas may voluntarily inform the [D]epartment [of Public Safety] or the board,
orally or in writing, of the full name, date of birth, and address of a
patient over the age of 15 years whom he or she has diagnosed as
having a disorder or disability specified in the rules of the department. The release of such information by the physician to the board
is an exception to the patient-physician privilege
requirements of
7
Section 5.08 of the Medical Practice Act.'
The court interpreted this section to mean that "[t]reating physicians
are permitted by statute, but are not required," to disclose confidential
information of a patient diagnosed with epilepsy.:
Moreover, section 611.004, the confidentiality statute, does not state
that the psychiatrist may disclose to any third parties, including identi31. Thapar v. Zezulka, 994 S.W.2d 635, 639 (Tex. 1999).
32. Id. at 639 & n.22.
33. Id. at 639.
34. See 967 S.W.2d 391, 394 (Tex. 1998).
35. Id. at 392.
36. See id. at 392-93.
37. Id. at 394 n.2 (citing Act of May 15, 1989, 71st Leg., R.S., ch. 95, § 1, 1989 Tex.
Gen. Laws 422, 423 (recodified 1995) (current version at TEx. HEALTH & SAFETY
CODE ANN. § 12.096(a) (Vernon Supp. 2001 and indicating that recodification did not
substantively change the pertinent law applicable to the case))) (emphasis added).
38. Id. (emphasis added).
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fiable victims, but rather limits the scope of this exception to medical
and law enforcement personnel. 9 Similarly, the statute at issue in
Praesel limited the scope of those to whom confidential information
may be disclosed to only the Medical Advisory Board or Department
of Public Safety. a° Thus, it would seem that the Texas Legislature has
even limited the scope of a psychiatrist's permissive authorization to
warn and that, in fact, a psychiatrist may be held civilly liable for
warning an identifiable victim under the Texas statute.4 1 Therefore, as
acknowledged by the Thapar court, a literal interpretation of the exception shows that although Thapar was not obliged to disclose Lilly's
threats, she could not have warned Lilly's family without breaching
the confidentiality statute.42
2.

Using Statutory Construction Aids to Interpret Section 611.004

Aside from a literal interpretation of section 611.004, the use of
other statutory construction aids leads to a similar conclusion that
there is no mandatory duty to warn. Section 311.023 of the Code of
Construction Act provides that when construing a statute, regardless
of whether or not the statute is considered ambiguous on its face, a
court may consider construction aids. The Act lists seven non-exclusive aids, and an analysis of four of these aids indicates that section
611.004 does not dictate a duty to warn but rather provides psychiatrists with a "permissive authorization" to disclose confidential
information.
Section 311.023(7) provides that courts may look to the title of a
statute to aid them in statutory interpretation. 3 The title of section
611.004 reads, "Authorized Disclosure of Confidential Information
Other than in Judicial or Administrative Proceeding. '4 4 "Authorized"
implies that the Texas Legislature intended for the release of confidential information only in certain instances and certainly does not
imply a mandatory duty to disclose. A logical reading of the title results in the conclusion that psychiatrists have discretion to disclose
under the authority of the Legislature but are not obligated to do so.
Section 311.023(3) states that a court may consider the legislative
history of a statute. 45 The "permissive" standard in section 611.004
was adopted from the original Act of 1979, which stated:
Exceptions to the privilege of confidentiality, in other than court
proceedings, allowing disclosure of confidential information by a
39. See
2001).
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.

TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN.

§ 611.004(a)(2) (Vernon Supp.

Praesel, 967 S.W.2d at 394.
See Tex. H.B. 1163 § 5, 66th Leg., R.S., 1979 Tex. Gen. Laws 239.
Thapar v. Zezulka, 994 S.W.2d 635, 639 (Tex. 1999).
TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 311.023(7) (Vernon Supp. 2001).
TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 611.004 (emphasis added).
TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 311.023(3) (Vernon 1998).
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professional, exist only... to medical or law enforcement personnel
if the professional determines that there is a probability of imminent physical injury by the patient/client to himself or to others, or
where there is the probability of immediate mental or emotional

injury to the patient/client.46
The fact that this same permissive standard was adopted in the current
legislation reinforces the conclusion that the Texas Legislature did not
intend to impose on psychiatrists a mandatory duty to warn third parties. Had the legislature intended such a mandatory duty to be imposed, it seems that it would have taken the opportunity to do so
when amending the 1979 Act in 1991 and 1999 or when codifying the
Act in the Texas Health and Safety Code.
Section 311.023(4) states that courts may refer to common law or
former statutory provisions, including laws on the same or similar subjects. 4 7 The Thapar court most often employed this construction aid.
The court compared section 611.004 with section 261.101(a) of the
Texas Family Code in order to ascertain the legislative intent behind
the Texas confidentiality statute. Section 261.101(a) states that "[a]
person having cause to believe that a child's physical or mental health
or welfare has been adversely affected by abuse or neglect by any person shall immediately make a report as provided by this subchapter. '48 The court referred to an earlier case in which it found that
the legislative scheme behind this statute was the "strongly avowed
policy to protect children from abuse. '49 The court agreed that this
policy was evidenced by the fact that the statute makes the reporting
of child abuse mandatory and further provides that those who report
child abuse in good faith are shielded from civil and criminal liability. 50 The court thus concluded that "imposing a common law duty to
report was consistent with the legislative scheme governing child
abuse."5 1

There is no similar "strongly avowed policy" to protect third parties
found in section 611.004 of the Texas Health and Safety Code and its
derivatives. As noted above, the Code does not demand mandatory
reporting of threats, but merely permits disclosure in certain situations. Had the Legislature intended the need to protect third parties
from dangerous patients to override the need of confidentiality between psychiatrists and patients, then surely it would have made the
reporting of threats mandatofy as it did in the Family Code. Furthermore, the Family Code imposes criminal penalties on those who fail to
46. Tex. H.B. 1163 § 4, 66th Leg., R.S., 1979 Tex. Gen. Laws 239 (emphasis
added).
47. TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 311.023(4).
48. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 261.101(a) (Vernon Supp. 2001) (emphasis added).
49. Thapar v. Zezulka, 994 S.W.2d 635, 639 (Tex. 1999) (referring to Golden
Spread Council, Inc. v. Akins, 926 S.W.2d 287, 291 (Tex. 1996)).
50. See id.
51. Id. at 640.
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disclose child abuse, yet the Legislature chose not to impose civil or
criminal penalties on psychiatrists who choose not to report a patient's
threats.5 z Finally, unlike the Family Code, the Health and Safety
Code does not shield psychiatrists from civil liability in situations
where they make unwarranted disclosures in good faith.53 Therefore,
as the court in Thapar concluded:
[11f a common-law duty to warn is imposed, mental-health professionals face a Catch-22. They either disclose a confidential communication that later proves to be an idle threat and incur liability to
the patient, or they fail to disclose a confidential communication
that later proves to be a truthful threat and incur liability to the
victim and the victim's family. 54

It is clear that the Texas Legislature prioritizes physician-patient confidentiality over the protection of third parties in section 81.103(a) of
the Health and Safety Code. This section provides that "[a] test result
is confidential. A person that possesses or has knowledge of a test
result may not release or disclose the test result or allow the test result
to become known except as provided by this section."55 The Code
then lists only nine instances when test results can be disclosed.56 Significantly, the Code does not allow disclosure of test results to a patient's family or sexual acquaintances 57 but rather only allows
disclosure to a patient's spouse if the patient has tested positive for
AIDS or HIV infection. 58 The implication of this statute is threefold.
First, if a patient tests positive for a potentially fatal sexually transmitted disease other than AIDS, the physician cannot disclose the results
of the test, not even to the patient's spouse. Second, if the patient
tests positive for AIDS, the physician can only warn the patient's
spouse, not a fianc6 or lover. In Texas, same-sex marriage is not recognized; 5therefore,
a homosexual's partner can never qualify as a
"spouse." 9 Thus, a physician may find himself in a position where he
knows that his patient has tested positive for AIDS or other fatal diseases and that the patient is not going to warn his sexual partner, yet a
physician cannot disclose the test results to the partner. Third, the
52. Compare TEX.

FAM. CODE ANN.

§ 261.109 (Vernon 1996), with

TEX. HEALTH

& SAFETY CODE ANN. § 611.002 (Vernon Supp. 2001) (prohibiting disclosure of confidential information except as provided in the statute).
53. See Thapar, 994 S.W.2d at 640 (citing Act of Aug. 27, 1979, 66th Leg., R.S., ch.
239, §§ 4(b)-5, 1979 Tex. Gen. Laws 514 (current version at TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY
CODE ANN.

§§ 773.092, 773.094 (Vernon 1992))).

54. Id.
55. TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 81.103(a) (Vernon 1992).
56. Id.§ 81.103(b)(1)-(9).
57. See id.
58. Id. § 81.103(b)(7).
59. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 2.001(b) (Vernon 1998) (stating that persons of the
same sex may not obtain a marriage license). See also id. § 1.104 (prohibiting persons
not married in accordance with Texas laws from contracting in the capacity of a
spouse).
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statute requires that the patient must first test positive before the physician can release the test results. Therefore, even if the physician suspects that a patient may be HIV positive, or if the patient has in fact
told the physician that he is positive, the physician cannot disclose this
information to the spouse. Recently, the Texas Supreme Court held
that a health care provider has no duty under the Health and Safety
Code to notify a wife of her husband's possible exposure to blood
contaminated by the HIV virus." To fortify the confidentiality requirement of section 81.103(a), the statute provides that anyone who
discloses such information in violation of the statute is criminally
liable.6
The likelihood that a third party will be harmed by nondisclosure of
this confidential information outlined in the scenarios above is far
greater than the likelihood that someone will be harmed by the nondisclosure of confidential information pertaining to a mental health
patient's dangerous fantasies. Yet, Texas statutory law not only prevents a physician from disclosing such information but also imposes
criminal liability on those who do disclose, even in good faith. Arguably, the Texas Legislature could not have intended psychiatrist-patient
confidentiality to be any less inferior to the confidentiality between a
patient and a person who has knowledge of his test results. There is
no logical basis to distinguish between the two. Therefore, when compared with the Texas Family Code and Health and Safety Code, it is
clear that the Texas Legislature could not have intended for the Texas
confidentiality statute to impose upon psychiatrists a mandatory duty
to warn.
Section 311.023(5) states that courts may look to the consequences
of a particular statutory construction.6 2 The Texas Supreme Court
correctly resolved that the Texas Legislature did not intend to place
psychiatrists in a double bind situation.6 3 Whether one looks at the
plain meaning of section 611.004 or uses construction aids to interpret
its meaning, the conclusion should be the same: the Texas confidentiality statute does not mandate a duty to warn on the mental health
profession.

60. See Santa Rosa Health Care Corp. v. Garcia, 964 S.W.2d 940, 943-44 (Tex.
1998).
61. See TEX. HEALrH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 81.103(j) ("A person commits an
offense if, with criminal negligence and in violation of this section, the person releases
or discloses a test result or other information or allows a test result or other information to become known. An offense under this subsection is a Class A
misdemeanor.").
62. TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 311.023(5) (Vernon 1998).
63. See supra text accompanying note 54.
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Comparison of Section 611.004 with Statutory Provisions of
Other Jurisdictions

Numerous jurisdictions have adopted similar statutory rules imposing a duty on psychiatrists to warn third parties.64 "Some statutes are
permissive, allowing the psychiatrist to choose whether or not to warn.
Other statutes impose a duty, leaving the psychiatrist no discretion."6 5
Ideally, each of the statutes should be analyzed to ascertain whether
this duty is mandatory or permissive. For example, the Nebraska statute is representative of one that could be interpreted as imposing a
mandatory duty. It provides:
No monetary liability and no cause of action shall arise against any
psychologist for failing to warn of and protect from a client's or patient's threatened violent behavior or failing to predict and warn of
and protect from a client's or patients violent behavior except when
the client or patient has communicated to the psychologist a serious
threat of physical
violence against a reasonably identifiable victim
66
or victims.

The language of the Nebraska statute makes it clear that a physician
will be liable if he fails to warn third parties in certain specified situations. The statutes at issue in Thapar and Praesel neither impose upon
psychiatrists such a mandatory duty to warn nor penalize them for
nondisclosure.
Significantly, such "mandatory" language is not found in the California confidentiality statute that was at issue in Tarasoff. In Tarasoff,
a psychotherapist was held liable for failing to warn a victim that the
victim's killer had confided his intention to kill her during a therapy
session two months earlier.6 7 The Supreme Court of California held
that section 1024 of the Evidence Code created a statutory duty to
warn the victim, constituting a "specific" exception to the physicianpatient privilege.6 8 However, as the dissent in Tarasoff correctly
pointed out, the Evidence Code was the inappropriate statute to apply
as the case did not involve an in-court disclosure by a psychiatrist.6 9
Rather, the applicable statute in Tarasoff was the Lanterman Petris
Short Act of 1969 (LPSA).70 That Act provides, in part, that "[a]ll
64. Bradley v. Ray, 904 S.W.2d 302, 309 (Mo. Ct. App. 1995) (listing the jurisdictions that have adopted such statutes).
65. Jacqueline M. Melonas & Marynell Hinton, Experts Share Advice on Reducing
Risk When Treating Potentially Violent Patients, PSYCHIATRIC NEWS, Oct. 2, 1998,
http://www.psych.org/pnews/98-10-02/advice.html.

66.

NEB. REV. STAT.

§ 71-1, 206.30 (1994) (emphasis added).

67. Tarasoff v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 551 P.2d 334, 339-40 (Cal. 1976).
68. See id. at 347.
69. Id. at 456 (Clark, J., dissenting) ("Because they are necessary to the administration of justice, disclosures to the courts are excepted from the nondisclosure requirement by section 5328, subdivision (f). However, this case does not involve a
court disclosure. Subdivision (f) and the Evidence Code sections relied on by the
majority are clearly inapposite.").
70. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §§ 5000-5587 (West Supp. 2001).
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information and records obtained in the course of providing services
S.. shall be confidential."7 1 When the Tarasoff decision was issued,
the statute provided for only two exceptions to this confidentiality requirement, none of which were applicable to the case at bar. 72 Notably, the two exceptions were permissive, not mandatory, in nature.73
An additional exception that would have been applicable in Tarasoff,
but was enacted afterward, also involves non-mandatory language.
That exception provides:
[w]hen a patient, in the opinion of his or her psychiatrist, presents a
serious danger of violence to a reasonably foreseeable victim or victims, then any of the information or records specified in this section
may be released to that person or persons and to law enforcement
agencies as the psychiatrist7 4determines is needed for the protection
of that person or persons.
Therefore, it is evident that even after Tarasoff,the California Legislature did not intend to impose a mandatory duty to warn third parties
upon psychiatrists; however, the California courts continue to impose
such a duty. 75 In so doing, the California courts have forced psychiatrists into the following dilemma:
The duty to warn recited in Tarasoff and the confidentiality provisions of LPSA hold a California psychiatrist, treating patients under
LPSA, in an apparently inextricable dilemma. If the psychiatrist
does not give the warning under the Tarasoff standard, then he may
be liable for civil damages, or if he does give the warning, the patient whose confidence he has betrayed may sue him on the statutory basis of [the LPSA].7 6
Though it has been noted that numerous jurisdictions have adopted
a statutory rule imposing a mandatory duty to warn in situations similar to that addressed in Tarasoff,77 it is of equal significance that numerous jurisdictions have adopted statutes stipulating only a
71. Id. § 5328.
72. Tarasoff, 551 P.2d at 356-57.
73. See CAL. WFLF. & INST. CODE § 5328(g) (allowing disclosure to governmental
agencies); id. § 5328.3(a) (specifying that a physician may inform a patient's family
and governmental agencies of a patient's disappearance from a designated facility).
74. Id. § 5328(r) (emphasis added).
75. See, e.g., Menendez v. Superior Court, 834 P.2d 786, 800 (Cal. 1992); People v.
Wharton, 809 P.2d 290, 314 (Cal. 1991) (following Tarasoff). See generally Hoff v.
Vacaville Unified Sch. Dist., 968 P.2d 522, 526-27 (Cal. 1998) (recognizing that in
some instances the relationship of school personnel to students gives rise to a duty of
care but holding otherwise to the facts presented).
76. Gammon & Hulston, supra note 5, at 787-88 (quoting Robert N. Cohen, Note,
Tarasoff v. Regents of the University of California: The Duty to Warn: Common Law
and Statutory Problems for California Psychotherapists,14 CAL. W. L. REV. 153, 178
(1978)).
77. Bradley v. Ray, 904 S.W.2d 302 (Mo. Ct. App. 1995) (listing the jurisdictions
that have adopted mandatory duty-to-warn statutes).
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permissive duty to warn third parties.7 8 However, courts in many
states, not just California, are guilty of misinterpreting or simply ignoring the state's confidentiality statute. 9 Therefore, psychiatric
guidelines in such states are forced to suggest:
By their terms, these provisions are merely permissive authorizations that allow a psychiatrist to give a warning to an identified victim-they do not require that the psychiatrist provide such a
warning. However, absent contrary case law, psychiatrists practicing in states that have such provisions should proceed on the assumption that state law does, in fact, impose such a duty to warn. °
Thanks to the Supreme Court's unanimous ruling in Thapar, Texas
does not have conflicting case law, and a psychiatrist can be certain
that Texas law does not impose a mandatory duty to warn. However,
for those states whose judiciary has not clearly spelled out the law in
this area, it is suggested that "[a] psychiatrist should not tread these
murky waters alone. A lawyer should be contacted. The lawyer can
analyze the situation in relation to the relevant statutory and case
law.""s
IV.

COMMON LAW DUTY TO WARN

Cases interpreting both the Restatement of Torts and Texas case
law immediately preceding Thapar suggest that a psychiatrist is very
rarely under a common law duty to warn third parties, even if they are
readily identifiable, because the psychiatrist's relationship with the patient does not warrant such a duty.
A.

The Restatement

While the general rule is that there is no duty to control the conduct
of another8 2 or to warn those endangered by such conduct,8 3 section
315A of the Restatement of Torts provides for an exception to the
general rule. The exception applies when "a special relation exists between the actor and the third person which imposes a duty upon the
78. See JoANN E. MACBETH ET AL., LEGAL RISK MANAGEMENT ISSUES IN THE
PRACTICE OF PSYCHIATRY 4-11 to 4-12 (1994) (listing nine jurisdictions, including
Texas, whose statutes'refer to only a permissive breach of confidentiality),
79. See, e.g., Almonte v. N.Y. Med. Coll., 851 F. Supp. 34 (D. Conn. 1994) (failing
to consider confidentiality issues in deciding a psychiatrist had a duty to warn a third
party of potential harm from a patient).
80. MACBETH ET AL., supra note 78, at 4-10. See also CONFIDENTIALITY VERSUS
THE DUTY TO PROTECT: FORESEEABLE HARM IN THE PRACTICE OF PSYCHIATRY

19

(James C. Beck ed., 1990) (pointing out that "[i]f a patient seriously injures someone,
and the patient's therapist failed to exercise due care, the courts will find a way to
hold the therapist liable, statutes notwithstanding").
81. Laub, supra note 7, at 7.
82. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 315 (1965).
83. See id. § 314 cmt. c.
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actor to control the third person's conduct." 4 The Tarasoffcourt held
that a doctor-patient relationship or a hospital-patient relationship
alone was sufficient to establish a special relationship under the meaning of the Restatement.8 5 The court did not address the concept of a
psychiatrist's "control" over his patient but merely assumed that such
control existed by concluding that "[s]uch a relationship may support
affirmative duties for the benefit of third persons. ' 86 However, a
closer analysis of the Restatement indicates that the Tarasoff court
misinterpreted the Restatement's provisions relating to the duty to
control third persons. In fact, the scope of the "special relation" concept does not, and should not, extend so far as to cover situations
where a patient has voluntarily sought help from a psychiatrist.
Comment c to section 315 states that "[t]he relations between an
actor and a third person which require the actor to control the third
person's conduct are stated in [sections] 316-319. " 87 The applicable
section, section 319, states that "[o]ne who takes charge of a third person whom he knows or should know to be likely to cause bodily harm
to others if not controlled is under a duty to exercise reasonable care
to control the third person to prevent him from doing such harm."8 8
Implicit in this exception is the recognition that before a duty may be
imposed on an actor, the actor must possess some degree of control
over the third person. Logically, a psychiatrist cannot control a voluntary patient. The vast majority of "out-patients" and "in-patients" are
voluntary patients.8 9 In fact, only a small percentage of patients are
involuntary patients, such as those committed by the State. Therefore,
a psychiatrist will rarely find himself in a position where he has control over his patient.
An example of such a rare occasion appears in the recent federal
case of Garamella v. New York Medical College.90 This case concerned the relationship between a psychiatrist and a psychiatric resident at New York Medical College. 91 As part of residency training,
Joseph DeMasi was required to undergo psychoanalysis conducted by
Dr. Ingram, a faculty member, who was also a board-certified psychiatrist. 92 Dr. Ingram was obligated by his position to disclose to New
84. Id. § 315(a).
85. Tarasoff v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 551 P.2d 334, 343 & nn.6-7 (Cal.
1976).
86. Id.
87. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 315 cmt. c.
88. Id. § 319 (emphasis added).
89. In fact, annual statistics from a local psychiatric hospital show that only seven
percent of in-patients are involuntary and less than one percent of out-patients are

involuntary. The out-patient statistic is drastically low primarily due to the fact that it
is very difficult to enforce out-patient committals. Interview with Peggy Bailey, Chief
Administrator, Springwood Psychiatric Hospital, Bedford, Texas (Jan. 29, 2000).

90. 23 F. Supp. 2d 167 (D. Conn. 1998).
91. Id. at 169.
92. Id.
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York Medical College: (1) whether DeMasi was undergoing the required personal psychoanalysis; (2) whether DeMasi was ready to begin analyzing patients of his own; and (3) whether DeMasi was ready
to be certified as a psychoanalyst. 93 During a training session, DeMasi
told Dr. Ingram that he was a pedophile. 94 Subsequent to this disclosure, DeMasi had conducted a psychiatric rotation at a hospital, and
during that rotation, he had sexually assaulted a ten-year-old boy.95
The U.S. District Court for the District of Connecticut held that a jury
could find the ten-year-old to be "within a foreseeable class of victims
to whom Dr. Ingram might owe a duty of care arising from DeMasi's
disclosures." 96 However, in so holding, the court specifically noted
that "the relationship between Dr. Ingram and DeMasi cannot be
characterized as strictly that of a psychiatrist-voluntary patient."9 7
The court explained that this was because Dr. Ingram was DeMasi's
instructor, as well as his analyst, and therefore, "he had a control
mechanism over DeMasi that does not exist in the usual analyst-voluntary patient relationship."98 In analyzing this degree of control, the
court focused specifically on the question of how burdensome it would
be for Dr. Ingram to control DeMasi and concluded that
[e]ven without breaching the confidentiality of DeMasi's communications, as an instructor, Dr. Ingram was authorized to notify
NYMC that: (I) DeMasi was not engaging in training analysis for
certification, as required; (2) DeMasi had revealed information
which made him unsuitable for psychoanalytic training; and (3)
NYMC would be advised to review whether DeMasi 99
should remain
in the residency program practicing child psychiatry.
Thus, the court made it clear that it is only in certain limited circumstances that a psychiatrist would be in a position to control a patient.
One commentator recognized that Garamella was a fact-specific decision, stating that "[t]he distinguishing factor in the decision was the
element of control that Dr. Ingram retained over Dr. DeMasi, above
and beyond the typical psychiatrist-patient relationship."' 0 0 Clearly,
certain factors must be present before a psychiatrist can be held to
have a sufficient degree of control over his patient. For example, as in
Garamella, a psychiatrist may have control over the patient's career
or, as is usually the case with involuntary patients, may have control
over a patient's actual liberty. Because most psychiatric patients are
voluntary and have only a psychiatrist-patient relationship with their
psychiatrist, these instances of control are extremely rare and fact-spe93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.

Id.
See id. at 170.
See id. at 170-73.
Id. at 174.
Id. at 173.
Id.
Id. at 174.
Laub, supra note 7, at 7.
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cific. Consequently, a correct interpretation of the Restatement of
Torts would reveal that psychiatrists are rarely in a special relationship
with their patients sufficient to impose upon them a duty to warn.
In Nasser v. Parker,the Supreme Court of Virginia recognized the
importance of the "takes charge" language of section 319 in determining whether a special relationship exists under section 315(a).'01 In
Nasser, the father of a homicide victim brought an action for damages
against the assailant's doctor and hospital for failing to warn the victim that her former boyfriend, who had threatened to kill her, had
been released from the hospital. 0 2 The court expressly disagreed with
Tarasoffs holding that a doctor-patient or a hospital-patient relationship automatically qualifies as a "special relation" under Restatement
section 315(a). °3 Rather, the court stated that
[t]here is nothing special about the ordinary doctor-patient relationship or hospital-patient relationship. We think there must be added
to those ordinary relationships the factor, required by § 319, of taking charge of the patient, meaning that the doctor or hospital must
be vested with a higher degree of control over the patient than exists in an ordinary doctor-patient or hospital-patient relationship
before a duty arises concerning the patient's conduct. 1 4
The court concluded that because the patient was admitted to the psychiatric hospital on a "voluntary basis," the hospital and the treating
psychiatrist were not under a duty to control his conduct.1 05
Likewise, the psychotherapist in Tarasoff never had legal control
over her "dangerous patient," causing some commentators to characterize the decision as "unpersuasive" for failing to reference section
319 of the Restatement.' 016 The Tarasoffplaintiffs alleged that the patient, Poddar, voluntarily sought counseling with Dr. Moore, a psychotherapist, and confided to Dr. Moore his intentions to kill Tarasoff, a
girl with whom he had become obsessed. 10 7 The plaintiffs also alleged
that at Dr. Moore's request, police briefly detained Poddar but released him because he appeared rational. 10 8 Furthermore, the plaintiffs alleged that Dr. Moore's superior ordered that no further action
be taken, such that no one warned Tarasoff or her family of the
threat.'0 9 Two months after Poddar allegedly confided his intentions
to Dr. Moore, he killed Tarasoff." ° The court held that
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.

455 S.E.2d 502, 505 (Va. 1995).
Id. at 502-03.
See id. at 506.
Id.
See id.
Peter F. Lake, Revisiting Tarasoff, 58 ALB. L. REV. 97, 130 (1994).
Tarasoff v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 551 P.2d 334, 339-41 (Cal. 1976).
Id. at 339-40.
Id. at 340.
Id. at 339.
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[w]hen a therapist determines, or pursuant to the standards of his
profession should determine, that his patient presents a serious danger over violence to another, he incurs an obligation to use reasonable care to protect the intended victim against such danger. The
discharge of this duty may require the therapist to take one or more
various steps, depending upon the nature of the case. Thus it may
call for him to warn the intended victim or others likely to apprise
the victim of the danger, to notify police, or to take whatever other
steps are reasonably necessary under the circumstances.'I
Though the court referred to section 315 in arriving at its conclusion
that there was a "special relationship" between Dr. Moore and Tatiana," 2 it did not proceed to the next step of analyzing the "special
relation" factor under section 319, as was specifically directed by comment c of section 315.' l 3 If the court had referred to section 319, its
illustrations, and comments, it would have realized that Dr. Moore
had absolutely no legal control over Poddar and therefore should not
have been held to be in a special relationship with him. In fact, the
only people that possibly could have asserted legal control over Poddar were the campus police, who knew of Poddar's dangerous propensity towards the victim, yet chose to release him." 4 Though police
have the immediate ability to restrain an individual's liberty upon
probable cause1 15 (which could have been Dr. Moore's statement to
police that Poddar was dangerous and should be committed), the
court, ironically, found that there was no special relationship between
the police and Poddar or Tarasoff.1 6 The court found that therapists
have a special relationship with their patients because they can "control their dangerous patients through the exercise of both their statutory authority to initiate commitment proceedings and their
therapeutic influence," yet the court found no such relationship between the police and these patients, despite the police's "express duty
to assure public safety and their freedom from any obligation to preserve the confidentiality of [patients'] statements."' 7 Such disparity
in the court's treatment almost seems hypocritical. Why the Tarasoff
court chose to ignore section 319 and make the inferential leap to arrive at the conclusion that a "special relationship" existed based simply upon entry into the relationship is not answerable on any legal
grounds. Special relationships should not be so readily presumed. Instead, each case must be analyzed on its facts. There were no unique
factors in Tarasoff that would give rise to a special relationship. In
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.

Id. at 340.
Id. at 343.
See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
Tarasoff, 551 P.2d at 339-40.
Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 91 (1964).
Tarasoff, 551 P.2d at 341, 349.
Merton, supra note 4, at 296.
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fact, there are very few situations where a psychiatrist might find himself in a special relationship with his patient.
The requirement that there be some degree of control before a duty
is triggered has been recognized in Texas." 8 In Kehler v. Eudaly,"9 a
Fort Worth appellate court pointed out that the only time the Texas
Supreme Court recognizes duties to third parties is when there has
been "a special relationship between the defendant and the actor that
implicitly includes some right to control the action ... or when the
defendant who created or contributed to the actor's situation violated
a statute ...or when a duty is imposed to protect the general driving
public."" ' The court then held that there was no relationship between a physician and patient that would provide the type of control
necessary to impose upon the physician a duty to warn third parties. 2'
Although the Texas Supreme Court did not base the Thapar decision on common law, the facts indicate that the holding would have
been the same had the court considered the degree of control that
Thapar had over Lilly. Thapar almost always treated Lilly on an outpatient basis, and when she saw Lilly in the hospital, it was always on
a voluntary basis.' 2 2 Unlike the psychiatrist in Garamella,Thapar had
no other connection with Lilly outside their psychiatrist-patient relationship; thus, Thapar never had legal control over Lilly. In the future, the Texas Supreme Court should refer to the Kehler decision and
section 319 of the Restatement when dealing with the issue of characterizing a special relationship.
B.

Common Law

The Thapar court declined to follow Tarasoff on the basis that the
Texas confidentiality statute makes it unwise to recognize a common
law duty to warn identifiable victims of a patient's threats. However,
the court did not consider whether the common law alone recognizes
such a duty 123 because the question had not previously arisen. Prior
cases had simply held that 1physicians
had no common law duty to
24
warn unidentifiable victims.
Aside from any reference to the Restatement, the Thapar court was
correct in refusing to recognize a common law duty to warn, considering the court's holding one year earlier in Van Horn v. Chambers.'25
In Van Horn, the "[c]ourt held that a doctor who authorized the trans118. Kehler v. Eudaly, 933 S.W.2d 321 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1996, writ denied).
119. Id.
120. Id. at 332 (citations omitted).
121. See id.
122. Thapar v. Zezulka, 994 S.W.2d 635, 636 (Tex. 1999).
123. See id. at 638.
124. See, e.g., Limon v. Gonzaba, 940 S.W.2d 236, 238-41 (Tex. App.-San Antonio
1997, writ denied) (holding that there is no duty when the third person is not specifically identifiable).
125. 970 S.W.2d 542 (Tex. 1998).
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fer of a patient from a hospital critical care unit to a regular room
without restraints did not have a duty to hospital employees who were
injured in an attempt to restrain the patient after he assaulted a
nurse." 126 The plaintiffs alleged that the doctor knew or should have
known that the patient posed a danger to others and should have
treated him accordingly (i.e., that he had negligently misdiagnosed the
dangerousness of the patient), but the court concluded that it was only
27
the patient to whom the doctor owed a duty not to misdiagnose.1
Recall that the Tarasoff doctrine only imposes a duty to warn "once a
therapist does in fact determine, or reasonably should have determined under applicable professional standards, that a patient poses a
serious danger to others." 128 Therefore, jurisdictions that hold psychiatrists liable for failure to warn third parties are, in fact, holding psychiatrists liable for negligent misdiagnosis due to their failure to
recognize that a patient was so mentally unstable that he was likely to
act upon, as opposed to merely fantasize about, his homicidal threats
made during therapy.
Given the court's holding in Van Horn, a learned author prophetically stated, just prior to the Texas Supreme Court's ruling in Thapar,
that "it is unclear whether the Texas Supreme Court will adopt this
[failure to warn identifiable victims] doctrine given its indication that
doctors owe no duty to the public that depends on their proper diagnosis of their patients."12' 9 Though the plaintiffs in Thapar pled a separate claim of negligent misdiagnosis, which the court dismissed based
on Van Horn,13° it is clear that this action is inextricably intertwined
with a failure to warn action in the psychiatric field. The psychiatrist
in Thapar could not have been held liable for failure to warn a third
party unless she was first held liable for misdiagnosing the dangerousness of her patient. Because Texas law has recognized that a psychia31
trist cannot be liable to third parties for misdiagnosis of a patient,1
Texas psychiatrists have no common law duty to warn identifiable
third parties of patients' threats.
V.

JUSTIFICATIONS FOR THAPAR

Dangerousness is not a medical disease, and there is simply no diagnostic test to measure it. 132 Thus, how can the courts justifiably expect
psychiatrists to predict a patient's propensity for future violence?
Even when patients make specific threats with respect to identifiable
126. 20 WILLIAM V. DORSANEO III ET AL., TEXAS LITIGATION GUIDE § 321.07[6]
(2000).
127. Van Horn, 970 S.W.2d at 545.
128. Tarasoff v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 551 P.2d 334, 345 (Cal. 1976).
129. 20 WILLIAM V. DORSANEO III ET AL., TEXAS LITIGATION GUIDE § 321.07[6]
(1998).
130. See Thapar v. Zezulka, 994 S.W.2d 635, 638 & n.12 (Tex. 1999).
131. See supra text accompanying notes 126-27.
132. See Merton, supra note 4, at 299-300.
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third parties, why is a member of the medical profession liable when
such threats are carried out, yet other professionals and laymen are
not? Such threats are made daily. No doubt, we have, at some point
in our lives, made idle threats, such as "I'm going to kill 'X' if he does
not leave me alone," or "I want to kill my parents!" While most of
these threats are either mindless "venting" or mere fantasies, with no
intention of being carried out, unfortunately, some are not. Even so,
there is no sound ideological policy to hold psychiatrists liable for
these unfortunate incidents simply because the profession attempts to
treat those who may have a hidden violent propensity.
A.

Why Single Out the Mental Health Profession?

There is no sound reason to impose upon the mental health profession a duty that is not imposed upon other professionals or friends. A
clergy member is not liable for failing to disclose a confessor's sinful
thoughts of future crime because the common-law recognizes and respects this religious privilege.' 33 A friend of the perpetrator is not
liable for failing to warn an identifiable victim of possible danger because the common law refuses to impose such a duty. If neither a
trusted member of the clergy nor a trusted friend has a duty to warn
an identifiable victim, then why should that burden be placed on a
trusted psychiatrist? The burden cannot be justified simply because
the psychiatrist is paid to analyze the patient's thoughts. The Tarasoff
court justified the extension of a psychiatrist's duty to third parties on
the broad policy ground of "the public interest in safety from violent
assault."' 3 4 However, such an interest does not depend upon the professional relationship between the parties, for the priest and the
friend, in the examples above, could just as easily protect the public
from the ensuing violence. Under the Tarasoff court's rationale,
there is no reason not to impose such a duty on everyone, whether
professional or non-professional, in order to protect the public wellbeing. Even so, the court made the inferential leap of imposing this
extenuated duty on psychiatrists, seemingly based on the fact that they
are qualified professionals. The court stated:
The role of the psychiatrist, who is indeed a practitioner of
medicine ... [is] like that of the physician who must conform to the
standards of the profession and who must often make diagnoses and
predictions based upon such evaluations. Thus the judgment of the
therapist in diagnosing emotional disorders and in predicting
whether a patient presents a serious danger of violence is compara133. See, e.g., Terry Wuester Milne, Comment, "Bless Me Father,for I am About to
Sin... ": Should Clergy Counselors Have a Duty to Protect Third Parties?, 22 TULSA
L.J. 139 (1986) (distinguishing the situation from that of Tarasoff by analyzing the
"control" issue and the religious nature of clergy counseling).
134. Tarasoff v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 551 P.2d 334, 346 (Cal. 1976).
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ble to the judgment which doctors and professionals
must regularly
135
render under accepted rules of responsibility.
Comparing psychiatrists with "ordinary" physicians is fundamentally
flawed. Indeed, a psychiatrist is a practitioner of medicine, not a clairvoyant. There is a sharp contrast between diagnosing a physical condition and diagnosing a psychiatric condition, especially when the
-diagnosis involves a duty to warn others against dangers emanating
from the condition. For example, a physician can easily predict that
foreseeable third parties may be harmed if he does not warn them that
his patient has a communicable disease. However, it is much more
difficult for a psychiatrist to predict that foreseeable, even identifiable,
third parties will be harmed if he does not warn them of a patient's
threats. "Unlike the 'infectiousness' of a disease, 'dangerousness' is
not an objectively verifiable condition."'1 36 Rather, "dangerousness"
requires psychiatrists to look into patients' minds and speculate on
their "future response to a complex of variables, any one of which
may or may not occur."13 Neither psychiatry nor medicine is an exact
science. Therefore, psychiatrists should not be held to a higher standard of care than physicians simply because the psychiatric profession
strives to decipher the human mind.
While the Tarasoff court compared a psychiatrist's responsibility to
that of other "professions," it is notable that the American Bar Association Model Code of Professional Responsibility, which has been
adopted in some form by most states, 138 does not require attorneys to
disclose confidential information obtained from their clients, even if
disclosure may prevent imminent death or bodily injury. 139 A 1982
ABA House of Delegates proposal to reinstate a mandatory disclosure requirement was resoundingly defeated.1 4 ° The drafters of the
Code realized that "[i]t is very difficult for a lawyer to 'know' when
such a heinous purpose will actually be carried out, for the client may
have a change of mind."'' The same holds true for psychiatrists. In
fact, it is possible that a criminal defendant is more likely stating a
determined intention to carry out the act than would a psychiatrist's
patient, who in the majority of cases, is probably just airing a fantasy.
"[Olne of the best predictors of future violence is a past history of
135. Id. at 345.
136. Merton, supra note 4, at 299.
137. Id. at 299-300.
138. See MORTIMER D. SCHWARTZ ET AL., PROBLEMS IN LEGAL ETHICS 40 (5th ed.
2001) (stating that "[r]oughly 40 states and other jurisdictions have adopted new legal
ethics patterned on the ABA Model rules, but most of those have altered some of the
important rules, such as those concerning confidentiality").
139. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6(b)(1) (1999) (using permissive
language to show attorneys are not required to disclose information under the listed
circumstances, even though they may do so).
140. Stuart Taylor, Jr., Dishonesty in Law: A New Ethics Code Is Sought, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 17, 1982, at A23.
141. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6 cmt. 13 (1983).
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violence,"' 142 and it is asserted that a lawyer's client, especially a criminal defendant, is more likely to have a violent background than would
a psychiatric patient. Moreover, a psychiatric patient presumably airs
his fantasy in the hope of obtaining help from the psychiatrist. A defendant generally would have no such desire because his reason for
making the threat is anything but that of seeking help. Consequently,
it would be unjustifiable to penalize the psychiatrist who extracts the
threat, attempting to help the patient, but not the attorney whose job
143
will be finished, whether or not this threat is carried out.
B. A Moral Duty Should Suffice
The absence of any general legal duty to warn and protect identifiable third parties does not mean that disclosure is never warranted.
For example, as conceded in Part IV, a psychiatrist may be under a
legal duty to control the patient if the psychiatrist possesses a certain
degree of control over the patient.' 4 4 Likewise, public policy may dictate that once a psychiatrist actually determines the patient's dangerousness, he is under a moral duty to warn and protect third parties.
"The Canons of Ethics of physicians make it clear that there is a moral
duty to breach a patient's confidence should it be necessary in order
to protect the community."' 4 5 When a profession has imposed an ethical or moral duty on a profession, judicial intrusion is unwarranted.
Most, if not all, psychiatrists presumably will warn identifiable third
parties if they firmly believe that they have accurately determined patients' potential dangerousness. To impose a mandatory legal duty
upon psychiatrists would be self-defeating for it could lead to evaluations that are constantly second-guessed and evaluations that overpredict dangerousness in order to avoid civil liability.
C. The Drastic Consequences of a Mandatory Duty
The Tarasoff court stressed that requiring psychiatrists to warn a
patient's victim would not entail the "drastic consequences" of involuntary commitment or other detention measures. 46 However, according to Dr. Cathal Grant, a Texas psychiatrist:
If you think that a patient poses a threat to a third party that is so
serious as to warrant you warning that third party of the threat, then
your patient, under the standard level of care, is likely to be so seri142. Interview with Dr. Cathal Grant, M.D., Director of Psychiatry, H.E.B. Hospital, Bedford, Texas (Oct. 11, 1999).
143. This may explain why Texas has chosen not to adopt the exact wording of
Model Rule 1.6(b)(1) but rather to impose a mandatory duty to warn on attorneys
who have clearly established that a client is likely to commit a crime that may result in
serious injury or death. See TEX. STATE BAR R. art. X, § 9, R. 1.05(e)-(f).
144. See supra Part IV.A.
145. Alan A. Stone, The Tarasoff Decisions: Suing Psychiatrists to Safeguard Society, 90 HARv. L. REv. 358, 374 (1976).
146. See Tarasoff v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 551 P.2d 334, 346 (Cal. 1976).
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ously mentally ill as to warrant involuntary committal. To decide
not to commit may put the psychiatrist at risk of a negligence suit.
must commit. Warnings and committals are
Thus, if you warn, you
147
difficult to separate.

Therefore, an increase in involuntary commitments is precisely the
consequence likely to occur if such a duty is imposed.
Warning identifiable victims is not without unwelcome side effects.
When a person is threatened, even via a warning, he will most likely
experience fear and perhaps even paranoia. It has been recognized
that "[w]arned individuals may themselves become so severely distressed that they become unwitting victims who are psychologically
harmed by the duty to warn." 148 What should a warned individual do
upon receiving the warning? Call the police? If the police do not feel
that the patient is an immediate danger to himself or others, they cannot commit the patient, as was evidenced in Tarasoff.149 "Notification
of law enforcement officials may create only a temporary and prophylactic solution. Tarasoff amply demonstrates the limitations of the police in handling such situations."' 15° Furthermore, the victim or the
victim's family may attack the patient first, which "raises the question:
Should the therapist be liable to his patient if the warning precipitates
a violent assault upon the patient?" 15 ' If the judge or jury, with the
benefit of hindsight, decides that a reasonable therapist would have
found a patient's threats unfounded, then the therapist could be held
civilly liable in a breach of confidentiality action for the injuries that
the patient sustained.
The Tarasoff court held that "[t]he risk that unnecessary warnings
may be given is a reasonable price to pay for the lives of possible
victims that may be saved.' 1 52 However, an imposition of a
mandatory duty to warn may seriously undermine the psychiatrist-patient relationship and may even lead to an increase in violent behavior. The confidentiality of this relationship puts patients at ease and
gives them, in most instances, what may be their only chance to air
their violent fantasies. As this is probably the only way that society
can address these fantasies before they are acted out, it is important
for the patient to feel comfortable in airing these fantasies. David
Axelrad, President of the Texas Society of Psychiatric Physicians, believes that fantasy is a common experience. 53 "[A] patient can imagine killing a third party or family member and not act on impulse.
147. Interview with Dr. Cathal Grant, M.D., supra note 142.
148. ROBERT I. SIMON, CONCISE GUIDE TO PSYCHIATRY AND LAW FOR CLINICIANS
182 (2d ed. 1998).
149. See Tarasoff, 551 P.2d at 341.
150. Gammon & Hulston, supra note 5, at 780.
151. Id.
152. Tarasoff, 551 P.2d at 346.
153. Nathan Koppel, Psychiatrists Have No Duty to Warn of Patients' Threats, TEX.
LAw., July 5, 1999, at 5.
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With Thapar ...psychiatrists can adequately address such fantasies
without breaching their duty of confidentiality."' 1 54 Without recourse
to psychiatrists, mentally ill patients may be more likely to act upon
their fantasies instead of seeking help.1 55 Patients may be deterred
from seeking help if they are aware of the possibility that their fantasies will be disclosed to those that they fear most.' 56 As Doctor Grant
opines:
In eighteen years of practice, I have had several hundred patients
that have expressed homicidal thoughts in my office. None have
acted upon them. I would argue that had they been informed, prior
to the session, that I would be obligated to disclose any homicidal
threats, not one of these patients would have revealed these
thoughts. I would also not hesitate to surmise that out of those several hundred patients, some
may have acted upon their fantasies
57
without psychiatric help.'
Thus, the risk of unnecessary warnings is not in fact a reasonable price
to pay as it may well lead to an increase in violent behavior by these
patients.
It has been argued that "[t]he Tarasoff exception to confidentiality
is part of the same public policy exception requiring the reporting of
contagious diseases, suspected child abuse, and gunshot wounds for
the welfare of the patient and society."1'58 However, in the case of a
mental health patient who voluntarily seeks help from a psychiatrist, it
is clear that such a situation cannot be justifiably grouped under the
same public policy umbrellas as the above situations. When a mental
health patient seeks help, he knows that part of the therapy entails
confiding to the psychiatrist, and therefore, he is basically admitting
that he needs help. Unlike the above scenarios, the harm has not yet
occurred. The psychiatrist, with the aid of confidentiality, can attempt
preventative therapy at this stage. Disclosure of confidential information by a psychiatrist has a much more deleterious effect on the psychiatric profession than would similar disclosure by any other
professional. As one commentator recognized:
To psychiatrists, this is to ignore a basic distinction between physical
and psychiatric therapy: a gunshot wound or a venereal infection
will respond to medication and care, whether or not it is reported,
but revelation of the fantasy or wish embodied in a threat may undo
whatever has
already been accomplished in the therapeutic
1
relationship. 59
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.

Id.
See infra note 157 and accompanying text.
Id.
Interview with Dr. Cathal Grant, M.D., supra note 142.
SIMON, supra note 148, at 184.
Merton, supra note 4, at 305.

https://scholarship.law.tamu.edu/txwes-lr/vol7/iss2/3
DOI: 10.37419/TWLR.V7.I2.2

24

Grant: Psychiatrists Have No Duty to Warn Third Parties of Patients' Thr

20011

TARASOFF IS KICKED OUT OF TEXAS

In equating the psychiatric profession with the "non-psychiatric" medical profession, the Tarasoff court failed to recognize this crucial
distinction.
VI.

CONCLUSION

The deference to the legislature shown in the Thapar decision is
condoned and should set an example for other states to follow because legislative bodies are in a better position than judicial bodies to
decide upon matters of social policy. Judicial bodies may be
prejudiced by hindsight, or they may not have enough knowledge of
the world of psychiatry. If the medical profession, educated in such
matters, cannot agree on bright line criteria for predicting dangerousness, then how much more troublesome would a similar decision be
for the judiciary? With the benefit of voluminous statistics and endless hours of reasoned debate, the Texas legislature has clearly established that psychiatrists have discretion to warn identifiable third
parties. If a plain reading of the statue concludes that there is no
mandatory duty to warn, then the discussion should end at this point.
Unfortunately, such is not always the case. Therefore, it is disappointing that the Texas Supreme Court grounded its decision primarily upon the confidentiality statute. Had the court been required to
decide the case purely on common law grounds, it is opined that the
Restatement of Torts and the preceding Texas case law on negligent
misdiagnosis would have led the court to the same conclusion. Should
the court face such a task in the future, it is encouraged to follow the
national trend of focusing on the degree of control over a patient and,
additionally, to refer to the doctrine of negligent misdiagnosis before
finding a duty to warn.
Public policy considerations also confirm that psychiatrists should
have discretion in disclosure of their patients' confidences. Under the
Tarasoff doctrine, a psychiatrist may be held liable for not distinguishing between those fantasies that are likely to be acted upon and those
that are not, but ultimately, "the judgment of whether or not the psychiatrist's decision was right or wrong will be made by members of a
disciplinary board, a judge, or a jury, all of whom will have the benefit
of 20/20 hindsight."16 After Thapar, a psychiatrist in Texas will not
be judged by those who may be prejudiced by hindsight. Moreover,
the concept that a mandatory duty to warn is needed to protect public
safety is unfounded and self-defeating as it may cause an increase in
violent behavior. A psychiatrist's moral duty provides an adequate
balance between protecting the public and preventing unnecessary
committals of mentally ill patients. The Thapar holding will prevent
needless committals that could occur if a mandatory duty to warn
were imposed on psychiatrists, yet still protect both the general public
160. See Laub, supra note 7, at 5.
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and the patient. The Texas Supreme Court has inadvertently recognized what the Tarasoffcourt failed to-that public safety will be better protected by letting psychotherapists perform the duties of their
profession to the best of their human capabilities, not by threatening
these professionals with a double-edged sword.
Noreen M. Grant
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